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I. INTRODUCTIONO utside corporate directors are quickly becoming a leaner, better
informed, suspicious and almost extinct species. Prior to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's landmark decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,' a
corporate director's judgment was vehemently protected in the legal
system by the business judgment rule. In the Van Gorkom decision, the
Court "imposed liability upon directors for accepting an outside offer for
the purchase of the corporation without investigating whether a higher
price might be obtained and without making an investigation into the
value of the business."2
The disappearance of outside directors in American corporations had
already begun at the time of the Van Gorkom decision. But, the Van
Gorkom decision stripped corporate directors and officers of the protective
cloak formerly provided by the business judgment rule, rendering them
liable for the tort of gross negligence for the violation of their duties
under the rule.3
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2 R.W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF COIpPOR.ATIONs 306 (1986).
aLeisner, Boardroom Jitters: A Landmark Court Decision Upsets Corporate Directors,
BABRoN's, Apr. 22, 1985, at 34.
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Prior to the decision, the business judgment rule was simply defined as
the immunization of management from liability when the transaction in
question is within the powers of the corporation and the authority of
management, and the directors have complied with their duty to exercise
due care and their applicable fiduciary obligations, i.e., good faith.4 The
protection of the rule, coupled with director and officer liability insur-
ance, provided a relatively safe environment in which directors and
officers could function without fear of liability.
5
The availability of director and officer insurance began to notably
decrease as early as 1984.6 It was at this point that the insurance market
began tightening policy constraints and cancelling policies for financial
institutions. 7 This effect triggered awareness by attorneys of director and
officer liability as additional deep pockets.8
The Van Gorkom decision was viewed by many as the catalyst which
triggered the dramatic increases in the number of shareholder suits filed,
director and officer (hereinafter D & 0) insurance policy cancellations,
skyrocketing premiums,9 and the flight of the outside directors.' 0
Devastating decisions like Van Gorkom could be prevented or at least
be of a lesser magnitude if corporate counsel chose to use the proactive
approach to corporate representation by employing the techniques of
preventive law. The theory is similar to the time honored cliche "an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure."11
This Article will address the Board of Directors' mission, including the
various theories surrounding the duty of care, the effects of Van Gorkom,
the legislative remedies enacted to counteract the effect of Van Gorkom
and finally, the proactive approach of corporate client counseling.
II. THE FACTS OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM
The issue before the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom
was the adequacy of care exercised by the directors in the sale of the
SH.G. HENN AND J.R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRPoRA"ON 661 (3d ed. 1983).
s See generally Scheibla, The Liability Syndrome: Why So Many Corporate Directors
Suffer From It, BARRO'S, Nov. 4, 1985, at 28.
o Taravella, D & 0 Rates Rising as Much as 50%, Bus. INs., Sept. 3, 1984, at 1.
Id. There is no one reason for the tightening in the D & 0 market, but many say the
crisis at Chicago's Continental Bank, which has festered several lawsuits, has focused
underwriters' attention on D & 0 coverage.
s Id. at 55.
g Scheibla, supra note 5, at 28.
10 Korn, Directors Are Getting Hard to Find, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 351.
" The viewpoint expressed in this paragraph is the author's working definition of
proactive.
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corporation. The alleged negligence involved the amount of money that
would accrue to the shareholders as a result of the sale. 12
The target company was the Trans Union Corporation (hereinafter
TUC). TUC was a Chicago-based diversified holding company whose
principal line of business was leasing rail cars, water and waste treat-
ment equipment.' 3 TUC was faced with an accumulation of investment
tax credits and an insufficient cash flow to offset them. TUC's market
value was estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 14
The leader of TUC was fifty-seven-year old Jerome W. Van Gorkom.
Van Gorkom served for nearly twenty years as chairman of the board and
chief executive officer (CEO) of TUC.'5 The acquiring concern was the
Marmon Group owned by the Pritzker brothers of Chicago. Jay Pritzker
was the principal for the Marmon Group in this transaction. Pritzker was
a well-known takeover specialist and social acquaintance of Van
Gorkom.' 6
Prior to engaging in negotiations with Pritzker, Van Gorkom asked the
TUC comptroller to "work up some numbers" for a leveraged buyout with
a five year payoff.17 A leveraged buyout is a method of acquiring a
corporation by using borrowed funds which are normally repaid with
funds generated by the target's operations or by the sale of the target's
assets.18
In early September, Van Gorkom, without the knowledge of the other
directors or senior management, met with his social acquaintance,
Pritzker. At this meeting, Van Gorkom presented Pritzker with a
proposed offering price of $55 per share (current market price ranged
between $37 and $38)19 for 12.5 million TUC shares as well as a financing
structure that would accomplish the sale. Usually at meetings of this
type, Pritzker's interest in the possibility of acquiring the corporation
would have been tested.20
Van Gorkom had based his figure on his own intuition and the
eleventh-hour figures prepared by a TUC comptroller. Van Gorkom, as a
director, had participated in the acquisition of many other companies. 21
Within one week from this initial meeting with Pritzker, Van Gorkom
called an emergency Saturday board meeting. The TUC board, a group of
12 Spiegel, The Liability of Corporate Officers, 71 A.B.A.J. 51 (1985).
13 Directors Beware, FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 1985, at 8-9.
'4 Spiegel, supra note 12, at 51.
" Leisner, supra note 3, at 34.
16 Spiegel, supra note 12, at 51.
17 Leisner, supra note 3, at 34.
18 Levin, Owens-Illinois Inc. Says It Will Consider Sweetened Proposal by Kolhberg
Kravis, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
" Spiegel, supra note 12, at 51.
20 id.
21 Leisner, supra note 3, at 34.
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friends and business acquaintances, heard a twenty-minute presentation
by Van Gorkom about the merger. The presentation was followed by an
hour and a half of deliberations, after which they approved the merger.
Their approval was based solely on Van Gorkom's oral presentation.22
That very same evening, Van Gorkom signed the actual merger
documents during a social function marking the opening of the Chicago
Lyric Opera season.23 Van Gorkom would personally benefit from the sale
of TUC because he held approximately 75,000 shares of the company. 24
When Van Gorkom told senior management of the impending buyout,
he encountered massive resistance. Senior management later objected to
both the offering price and lack of an opportunity for TUC to seek
competing offers. The key officers threatened Van Gorkom with their
resignations if the buyout was permitted.25 Succumbing to the pressure,
Van Gorkom negotiated a ninety-day period in which TUC could solicit
other offers, 26 a possibility which had not previously existed for TUC.27
During this period, Salomon Brothers was engaged to field other offers.
With the omnipresence of the Pritzker clan, Salomon Brothers was
unable to come up with anything other than two nibbles, which were not
considered to be viable offers. 28 Finally, the acquisition was consum-
mated in February of 1981 when almost 70% of the TUC stock voted in
favor of the merger.29
Following the merger approval, a class action suit was filed seeking
rescission of the merger. The issue facing the court was whether the
shareholders were adequately informed of their options, including the
nibbles received by Salomon Brothers. The lower Delaware court ruled in
favor of Van Gorkom and the TUC directors.30
On appeal, the question before the court was whether Van Gorkom and
the TUC directors had exercised sufficient care in order to make an
informed decision. The Delaware Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, found
in favor of the shareholders. 31 The court held that the directors breached
their fiduciary duty of care to the shareholders by failing to disclose all
facts germane to the transactions. Additionally, the directors failed to
adequately inform themselves as to the value of the corporation and how
Van Gorkom arrived at the selling price. The court found the directors to
22 Id. at 36.
23 id.
24 Id. His benefit was roughly calculated to be four million dollars.
21 Spiegel, supra note 12, at 51.
26 id.
27 Leisner, supra note 3, at 36.
28 id.
29 id.
'o Spiegel, supra note 12, at 51.
31 Id.
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be grossly negligent in approving the merger with only an hour and a half
of deliberation. 32
The court ruled that Van Gorkom and the TUC directors' "meeting was
so badly flawed that no subsequent actions could rehabilitate things
sufficiently to make the protection of the Business Judgment Rule
available ."33
III. BOARD OF DIRECTORS' MISSION
The Board of Directors operating as a whole are to ensure that:
[L]ong-term strategic objectives and plans are established and
that proper management structure (organization, systems, and
people) is in place to achieve these objectives, while at the same
time making sure that the structure functions to maintain the
corporation's integrity, reputation, and responsibility to its var-
ious constituencies. 34 To best meet these duties, the board of
directors should act as an evaluative body independent of
management.35
Traditionally, directors had been protected by the safe harbor afforded
by the business judgment rule.36 The business judgment rule provides
that directors will not be held personally liable in damages for honest
mistakes in judgment.3 7 The rule is usually raised as a defense. 38 "The
reasons usually advanced for the rule are that a court is ill-equipped to
make business decisions and should not second-guess directors or substi-
tute its judgment for that of directors."39
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court restated their working definition
of the business judgment rule in the case of Aronson v. Lewis: "It is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors.., acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."40
Central to the fulfillment of the Board's generic mission is the duty to
exercise due care. Each director owes a duty of care to each corporation he
32 Leisner, supra note 3, at 37.
33 Id.
4 NAT'L A. OF CoRP. DIRECTORS, MINUTES OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, AMA HEADQUARTERS, N.Y.,
(Apr. 5, 1981).
" Kesner & Dalton, Boards of Directors and the Checks and (lm)Balances of Corporate
Governance, 29 Bus. HoRIzoNs 17, 19 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).
36 Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule on the Revised Model Act, the Trans
Union Case, and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1483, 1484 (1985).
37 Id. at 1485.
38 Id. at 1484.
39 Id. at 1485.
40 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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serves. As seen in the Van Gorkom case, the failure of the director(s) to
exercise the required duty of care has two discrete areas of potential
liability:4 1 the failure to exercise care in decision making42 and the
failure to exercise due care in the performance of directors' responsibili-
ties, other than decision making, such as delegation and oversight. 43
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), Section 8.30,44
the American Law Institutes (ALI) Section 4.01 of tentative draft No. 545
and the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Model
Statute for the Standard of Conduct for Directors46 are example codifica-
tions of standards of care for corporate directors.47 Each model codifica-
tion, all or in part, has been incorporated by the individual states. The
most stringent standard of care is the RMBCA 48 and the least stringent
is the NACD. The common area between the trio includes the belief that
a director will execute his duties in good faith, with the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances, and in a manner he believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation. This common ground is the area upon which liability may be
based. The legislative adoptions and ramifications will be addressed later
in this paper.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM on the Corporate World
Following the decision by the Van Gorkom court, shockwaves rocked
the corporate establishment. Two of the most profound effects were the
shrinking pool of available directors/officers and the limited availability
and high cost of liability insurance.49
A. The Disappearance of Outside Directors
"Directorships were once symbols of honor and achievement that
business leaders collected like club memberships. '" 50 Today, following the
D & 0 liability insurance crisis which was compounded by the share-
holder awakening in the Van Gorkom decision, corporations are finding it
"' Veasey & Seitz, supra note 36, at 1493.
42 id.
43 Id.
4' REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).
4' A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Apr. 12,
1985 as amended May 17, 1985).
46 NAT'L A. OF CORP. DIRECTORS, MODEL STATUTE STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR DIRECTORS (1987).
41 Veasey & Seitz, supra note 36, at 1493-97.
48 Id. at 1497.
'9 See generally Korn, supra note 10.
50 Id. at 351.
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harder to retain qualified directors and fill vacancies. This threatens one
of the basic tenets of corporate governance.5 1
Companies are being forced to employ headhunters to obtain candi-
dates to fill board vacancies. 52 Increasingly, opportunities to sit on boards
are being declined. 53 Today, only two out of five offers for board positions
are accepted according to a Spencer Stuart study.54 Directors are being
required to study more intricate management strategies.5 5 In addition to
the increased work, directors now have a one-in-five chance of being party
to a shareholder suit.56
Greater attention is being paid to the selection of new board members.
Candidates are being scrutinized more closely than ever before.5 7 In
selection of a new member, boards are paying less attention to personal
compatibility and social connections.58 However, outside directors are
still drawn from three primary sources: executives from other companies,
retired executives, and academicians. 59 The exodus of outside directors is
due in part to increased time demands as well as the D & 0 liability
insurance crisis.
To avoid accusations of gross negligence, many corporate directors
have sought to become actively involved in the management and over-
sight of the corporation. 0 Many professional directors and other outside
directors have cut down on their board memberships.6 1 This reduces the
pool of available, outside directors in many fields. Directors view their
roles as overseers not managers. 62 Additionally, smaller boards of
" Id. Outside directors became the majority in many of the major corporation boards
during the 1970s. Those who are classified as outside board members include:
1. Former officers and employees;
2. Relatives of officers;
3. Officers, directors, employees or owners of significant suppliers or customers;
4. Creditors;
5. Attorneys; and
5. Investment and commercial hankers.
Any relationship that involves an economic or personal relationship between the director
(or nominee) and management must be disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion via a 6(b) filing. The filing does not preclude the appointment of that individual.
52 Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56.
'3 Korn, supra note 10, at 351.
"' Baum & Byrne, supra note 52, at 56. The Spencer Stuart study is discussed in the
Baum article. Spencer Stuart is a personnel services firm.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Korn, supra note 10, at 351.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Baum & Byrne, supra note 52, at 51.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 61.
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directors,63 fewer meetings, and more inside directors have been notice-
able trends.
B. The Climax-Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis
"One-third of the over 1,100 directors of major U.S. corporations
responding to the recent Touche Ross survey say that the increased
liability to which they are exposed has caused them to consider resigning
from their board positions."64 This position has been a long time in
coming. Back in 1984, pre-Van Gorkom directors of financial institutions
were finding the availability of D & 0 insurance decreasing. 65 The most
frequent targets of policy cancellations were the banking, oil and gas, and
computer industries.66 A number of companies in these industries have
failed, thereby triggering lawsuits against directors. 67 In addition, com-
panies involved in takeover fights, or big pollution/product liability
claims are continuing to have difficulty in obtaining policies.68
Financial institutions' tenacity became vulnerable after the troubles at
Continental Illinois and Penn Square Bank.69 Major insurance firms
have stopped writing new policies for financial institutions.7 0 Many D &
0 policies for financial institutes exclude claims stemming from lawsuits
by regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, which file
suits against the directors and officers of failed banks hoping to collect on
D & 0 policies.71
Following Van Gorkom, D & 0 policies almost became extinct. Those
policies which were still available were coupled with lower coverage that
had more restrictions, and premiums that have escalated 200 percent or
more.7 2 Thus, defensive management became an everyday practice. The
avoidance of claims became vital to non-cancellation7 3
With the rise of litigation came an increasing awareness of the need for
insurance by directors of smaller corporations. 74 Survey results released
by The Wyatt Co., a Chicago research firm, showed that the closely-held
63 Id. at 56, 57.
Corporate Directors Seen Wary About Future, J. OF Acct., Feb. 1987, at 30.
65 Taravella, supra note 6, at 1.
66 Hilder, Liability Insurance is Difficult to Find Now for Directors, Officers, Wall St. J.,
July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
67 Id.
8 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 21, col. 1.
71 Id.
72 Olson, The D & 0 Insurance Disaster, AcRoss ThE BOARD, July-Aug. 1986, at 38.
73 Id.
7' Taravella, Many Small Businesses Ignore D & 0 Risk, Bus. INs., Dec. 10, 1984, at 30
[hereinafter D & 0 Risk].
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companies, when compared to New York Stock Exchange members,
exhibited the greatest growth in carrying D & 0 coverage during the
1974-84 period.75 Despite the strong market interest in the product (D &
O insurance coverage), the suppliers chose to cancel, place restrictions on,
or refuse to issue the requested coverage following the Continental
Illinois disaster 6
Many directors of small companies now feel their exposure to litigation
is not sufficiently acute to justify the cost that is being asked for the
insurance coverage.7 7 The smaller companies which obtain insurance and
have hopes of going public will most likely have to do so outside the
umbrella afforded by their policy.78 Insurers find small companies tend to
be in a higher D & 0 risk category because they are, generally, closely
held corporations. 79 Closely held corporations are often controlled by
family members. In addition, smaller corporations tend to be prime
takeover targets.8 0 Currently, in almost every policy, a takeover exclu-
sion is included to protect the insurance provider.8' Thus, the awakening
of small corporations to the threat of litigation did nothing more than wet
their appetite for D & 0 coverage that they could not afford.
Adding to the skyrocketing premiums were activist judges with their
theory of "cost spreading." In attempting to compensate victims, these
courts look to deep pockets, i.e., those who could absorb the cost. The
preferred pockets were those of insurance companies. The D & 0 policies
in this scheme were used after the exhaustion of the firm's regular
liability insurance.8 2
In some cases, directors have deeper pockets than the group they direct
(for example, bankrupt companies, companies without D & 0 policies,
churches, or schools). The ad terreom threat of personal liability can
increase the settlement value of the claim by making key executives
eager to quickly resolve their case.8 3 Thus, the risk of losing his fortune
is an effective deterrent to a candidate's accepting a board position.8 4
The ramifications created by one ruling, such as Van Gorkom, can be
enormous. The inherent power of the Delaware Supreme Court in
corporate America is unmatched. Its influence transcends to all indus-
tries and companies of every size.
"' Taravella, Firms Hiked D & 0 Limits During 1984, Study Says, Bus. INs., Jan. 21,
1985, at 24.
76 See generally Taravella, supra note 6, at 1.
7. D & 0 Risk, supra note 74.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 31.
80 id.
81 Id.
82 Olson, supra note 72, at 40.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 41.
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One example resulting from the Van Gorkom decision is shown in the
plight of the board of directors of the Detroit based Armada Corporation.
The absence of liability insurance triggered the resignation of eight of the
ten Armada Corporation directors. 85 The exodus of outside directors of
corporations followed the Van Gorkom decision. Inability to fill vacancies
with qualified people caused trends toward maintaining smaller boards.8 6
Smaller boards offer attractive benefits for corporations, such as fewer
directors with which to provide insurance coverage and increased aware-
ness of board members because their duties will be enlarged.8 7
Another reaction to the Van Gorkom decision was the proliferation of
offshore insurance subsidiary captives.8 8 Corporations whose interest
would go unprotected, since they were being priced out of the D & 0
insurance market, joined with others in the same predicament to form
"captives" who would provide their parent(s) with reasonably priced
insurance coverage. 89
The captives are generally set up in the Caymen Islands, Barbados, or
the Bahamas. The members of one captive called "CODA-Corporate
Officer and Director Assurance"; which writes D & 0 coverage for
companies with minimum net worths of $250 million, include Chase
Investment Bank of New York, Dart and Kraft Inc. of Northbrook,
Illinois, Squibb Corporation of Princeton, New York, Warner-Lambert
Company of Morris Plains, New Jersey and Pfizer Inc. of New York.90
Captives have been set up for higher educational institutions and
chemical companies as well.91
V. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES ENACTED TO COUNTERACT THE EFFECTS
OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM
On June 18, 1986, Delaware Governor Michael N. Castle signed into
law a provision which limits directors' presumed liability for their failure
to fulfill their duty of due care obligation to the corporation.9 2 In order for
" Pawling, The Crisis of Corporate Boards: Accountability vs. Misplaced Loyalty,
Bus. Q., Summer 1986, at 72, 73.
se Baum & Byrne, supra note 52, at 56.
87 See generally id. at 56-61.
88 Finlayson, More Buyers Consider D & 0 Captive, Bus. INs., July 7, 1986, at 2.
"Captives" are corporations who are wholly owned by one or more corporations. Captives
such as those designed to provide insurance usually have a limited corporate purpose and
are incorporated in jurisdictions like the Cayman Islands, which have laws more conducive
to the goals of parent(s). This enables the parent(s) to circumvent the local restrictions or
market conditions to achieve their goals.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 DEL. CODE ANN. Trr 8 SEMcON 102(B)(1) (1983 & 1986 supplement).
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a director to obtain the protection of 102(b)(7), the director must first
obtain shareholder approval s 3 Anthony G. Flynn, Counsel-to-the-
Governor, stated that allowing the shareholders to determine what they
wanted to do about liability fits in with the concepts of corporate
democracy and shareholder rights.94 This provision was seen as a
measure allowing corporations the discretion to decide whether to indem-
nify their directors. Prior to Van Gorkom, the board was automatically
afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.9 5
By enacting this law, Delaware has helped to preserve its second
largest source of revenue.96 Hospitality to corporations brought $131
million in corporate fees and taxes for the fiscal year 1985-86. Since the
law was enacted in July, 1986, incorporation filings have increased
fifteen percent. 97 Many of the new filings are re-incorporations made by
companies which are located in states less friendly to corporations. 98
Thus, Delaware has sustained its leading position as the "hot" place to
incorporate, despite a monumental court decision, courtesy of the Dela-
ware legislature.99
Thirty states, including Delaware, have recently enacted statutes
which govern directors and/or officer liability.100 Most of the state
provisions are based on either the Delaware law, the RMBCA, ALI or the
NACD Model Statute. Throughout the new provisions, directors are still
subject to suits by shareholders if they breach their duty of loyalty, fail to
act in good faith, are associated with "intentional misconduct," or commit
known violations of the law. 01 Note that these statutes do not protect
officers of the corporation from liability, with the exceptions of Louisiana
and Nevada. 10 2
To obtain the benefits of the newly enacted shield statutes, twenty-
seven of the thirty states require an affirmative action to be made by the
shareholders, thereby acknowledging their consent. The affirmative
action required by existing domestic corporations is a filing which
" Greenhouse, Liability Curb Aids Directors, N.Y. Times, August 12, 1986, at D2,
col. 1.
14 Lewin, Delaware Law Allows Less Director Liability, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1986, at
D1, col. 1.
95 Comment, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at
Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HAsv. J. ON LEGis. 527, 528 (1987).
96 Move to Delaware, FoRTuNE, Dec. 22, 1986, at 9.
11 Id. at 8.
98 Id. at 9.
99 Id.
100 C.T. CORPORATION, PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF DIRECTORS' AND/OR OFFICERS'
LAILrrY, Nov. 2, 1987.
101 See id.
102 id. at 5-9.
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amends one of the following: Articles of Incorporation, Certificate of
Incorporation, Corporation Bylaws or the Corporate Charter.l03
Three states, Indiana, Ohio, and Virginia,10 4 to a limited extent do not
require an affirmative action by the shareholders in order to enact the
indemnification provisions. Thus, all corporate directors can benefit from
the statutes without seeking shareholder approval. The NACD Model
Statute was based on the Indiana Statute. The Model Statute was later
adopted in Ohio leaving Ohio with the most pro-director shield statute.
The official commentary on the NACD Model Statute states, "if it is
desirable social policy to limit the liability of directors for certain types of
misconduct, then appropriately that should be a uniform provision
applicable across the board to corporations and should not depend upon
the actions of shareholders."' 05 This provision allows corporations to
avoid the expense of placing this issue on proxy materials.
The Ohio statute provides the standard of clear and convincing
evidence to be applied when determining if a director has violated his
duty to the corporation. This standard is preferable considering the
magnitude of personal liability that the director could face.106
The Ohio legislature, which was considering this legislation during the
hostile takeover attempt of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in
November of 1986, chose to enact this landmark legislation to strengthen
Ohio corporation law. The original aspects of this legislation, H.B. 902,
included the limitation of monetary liability on a director as well as the
strengthening of the business judgment rule.10 7
At the request of Goodyear, H.B. 902 was amended to provide
explicit statutory power (subject to fiduciary limits) for poison
pills to be issued by directors of Ohio corporations traded on a
national securities exchange and to expressly authorize the
write-up of intangible assets. Additional amendments explicitly
freed directors from per se personal guarantor liability upon the
corporate backing of loans to Employee Stock Ownership Plans
and expressly provided that directors of a target could consider
long-range, as well as short-range, interests of the corporation
103 Id.
"o Id. at 16. In Virginia, liability is limited to the lesser of $100,000 or the salary for one
year preceding the wrongful act, unless the lower limit is specified in the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws approved by the shareholders.
105 NAT'L A. or CORP. DIREcTos, MODEL STATUTE STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR DmECTORS, OFFICIAL
COMMENTARY (1987), at 3.
106 Id.
167 Shipman, Corporate Takeovers: Legislation and Related Developments in Ohio, OHIo
LAW., May-June 1987, at 12.
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and its shareholders in determining whether to oppose a hostile
offer. 0 8
Although the Goodyear amendments were initially sunset provisions
which would expire during 1987, Substitute Senate Bill 50 was enacted in
February, 1987, removing the sunset provision of H.B. 902 and extending
these amendments indefinitely.10 9 The Governor and the General Assem-
bly were instrumental in giving Ohio the most avante guard corporate
legislation in the country.
VI. PROACTIVE CORPORATE CLIENT COUNSELING
To prevent, or at least lessen the magnitude of a decision like Van
Gorkom, a variety of preventive measures can be employed by corporate
counsel.110
A. Incorporation or Reincorporation
When assisting your client in chosing one of the fifty states to
incorporate, it is necessary to look to the nature of the corporation, the
structure of the board of directors and officers as well as its size in the
market.
A corporation which has assets in excess of $25 million may seek to
incorporate in Delaware, rather than Ohio, due to the speed and expertise
of the Delaware court system. In addition, it is clear that the intent of the
Delaware legislature is to keep Delaware the number one choice for
incorporation by businesses.1 1' Thus, Delaware's law takes on the per-
sona of a market-shaped product which is designed to attract incorpora-
tion/reincorporation business, 112 thereby presenting fresh, new, and
improved packaging for the corporate conscience as new trends develop.
B. Relations with Insurance Providers
As corporate D & 0 insurance premiums escalate, despite becoming
more readily available due to increased entrance into the market, the
insurance broker becomes a vital ally to the corporate attorney. 113
The counseling and initial incorporation of a fledgling corporation
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 This section is purely the author's viewpoint upon what her proactive approaches to
client counseling in the corporate world would entail.
"' Schaffer, Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation
Shapes Corporate Law, 10 HARV. J. ON L. & Pus. PoL'y 665, 675 (Summer 1987).
112 Id.
11' Scheilba, A Plague of Lawyers: Being Sued Is Still Corporate Directors' No. 1 Worry,
BARRON'S, Nov. 17, 1986, at 38.
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includes the orientation of the client to the legal side of the business
world. In most cases, the client is armed with technology and money. The
client seeks counsel to handle the "details." A good relationship with at
least one corporate insurance broker will enable the client to obtain the
best policy available (if the client qualifies).
Discussing all aspects of your client's business with the broker will
assist him in designing the appropriate coverage. The client and/or his
board should be included in these discussions. The team effort between
the broker and the attorney can impress upon the client his obligations
under the law and the extent of the coverage needed through his
insurance policy.
C. Counseling the Board of Directors
Whether your client is a Fortune 500 company or a "baby" (newly
incorporated) corporation, the well-informed board of directors is an
invaluable intangible asset. With the increasing difficulty in obtaining
directors, a corporate attorney should resist the temptation, if possible, to
take a board seat and seek to educate the board as to its options when a
vacancy occurs.
Attorneys who act as counsel to the board should seek to be an ex-officio
member of the board. This would allow them to sit in on board meetings
and gain insight into possible legal complications stemming from the
directors' proposed strategies before the action is commenced. Addition-
ally, this allows the attorney to maintain an air of independence from the
others.
The Board has many options when a vacant seat appears. Four of the
typical options are mentioned here. First, it can choose to reduce the size
of the board, thus eliminating the expense for a qualified chair-filler.
Second, it can hire an executive search firm to identify qualified candi-
dates. Third, it can seek a member of management to fill the chair. The
final option is to find a young, aggressive go-getter who does not have a
personal fortune to lose in the event of a liability suit, but rather has
something to prove. The final option is the most viable for younger
corporations. This could enable corporations to continue to add depth to
their boards by adding a youthful perspective to corporate decisions, thus
preventing stagnation.
The Board, while considering these candidates, should be reminded to
question them as severely as if they were going to be hired for a
management position. In addition to assisting with filling vacancies, the
attorney should periodically send clippings and guidebooks with the
latest legal news that affects the board. Since directors' duty of loyalty
and care are always of concern, updates regarding statutory changes also
should be sent on a regular basis.
Currently, several publications, such as those produced by the Amer-
ican Bankers Association and the United States League which are
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designed to help outside directors understand their duties, are key
examples of what an attorney should make available to his client.
Government publications, like the director's handbook for directors of
national banks, which is produced by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, are excellent sources of tips and guidelines for board
members. 114 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales have developed video presentations, slides, and textual materials
for instructing boards on how to direct a good company. 115
Finally, the attorney can be at least one step ahead of litigation if he
takes the time to cover each of the following points, which are suggested
by the National Association of Corporate Directors, with each member of
the board and then the Board as a whole. The points are:
1. Assess your exposure.
2. Attend meetings.
3. Keep up to date on the company.
4. Be inquisitive.
5. Place objections on the record.
6. Be frank with the CEO.116
Thus, by assisting the client in keeping his board filled with qualified
directors and maintaining a continuing education program, the attorney
has prevented lawsuits, unwarranted regulatory agency inquiries, un-
warranted board resignations and, above all, has maintained job security.
VII. CONCLUSION
Proactive client counseling on the part of Jerome Van Gorkom's
attorney could have prevented or at least delayed the havoc caused by the
Delaware Supreme Court ruling in Smith v. Van Gorkom, had the
attorney merely used a few techniques such as calling on a friendly
investment banker, an accountant, and senior management. If the
attorney would have followed these techniques, then the gross negligence
theory could have been prevented. If those professionals noted above
had given at least a ten-minute presentation at that infamous Saturday
night board meeting, there is a high possibility that the Court would have
ruled differently.
Proactive client counseling, which is a nonadversarial job, can produce
a magnitude of positive results. By keeping boards of directors informed
as to the changes in their charged missions, insurance law changes, and
current legislation, a new facet of law is recognized-the corporate
114 Fitch, The Heat is On, U.S. BANKER, June 1985, at 32, 34.
"1 Woolf, The Hazards of Being a Director, ACCT., Nov. 1986, at 81.
116 Mauro, Staying on a Board and Out of Trouble, NAToN'S Bus., May 1986, at 46.
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counselor, not the corporate attorney. The mere word "attorney" brings
connotations of the adversarial process.
Whether your client is large or small, the effects of litigation, frivolous
or not, can be the same: disaster. Maintaining defenses and funding legal
teams can drain all of the client's resources, thereby thrusting him into
bankruptcy. This method is a profitable short-term way of increasing
legal fees but the income from a long-term client relationship will be
forgone. It should be noted that this Article does not purport to be
conclusive on any point other than the need for proactive corporate
counseling.
LYNN A. HOWELL
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